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If the central bank follows an interest rate rule, then inflation is likely to be persistence, 
even when prices are fully flexible.  Any shock, whether persistent or not, will cause inflation 
persistence if it causes a persistent change in the spread between the real interest rate and the 
central bank’s target.    Inflation persistence in U.S. data can be characterized by a vector 
autocorrelation function relating inflation and deviations of output from trend.  This paper 
shows that a flexible-price general equilibrium business cycle model with money and a 
central bank using an interest rate target can account for such inflation persistence.  
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Economics in Stockholm in June 2001. Introduction 
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) characterize inflation persistence in U.S. data using a 
vector autocorrelation function relating inflation and deviations of output from trend.  In 
the vector autocorrelation function, both inflation and output are highly persistent and 
there are significant positive cross-correlations between inflation and output.  Of course, 
vector autocorrelation functions, themselves, do not provide evidence about a particular 
economic structure, but these time series regularities are often invoked to justify the 
assumption that systematic monetary policy actions have real effects.   The identification 
problem is difficult and there is no widely accepted solution. 
   This paper shows that a flexible-price, general-equilibrium business cycle model 
in which monetary policy shocks have almost no real effects can account for the inflation 
persistence if the central bank follows an interest rate rule.  If it does, inflation dynamics 
are determined by the dynamics of spread between the real interest rate and the central 
bank’s interest rate target.  Any shock, whether persistent or not, will cause inflation 
persistence if it causes a persistent change in the spread between the real interest rate and 
the central bank’s nominal interest rate target.  Thus, inflation persistence is expected to 
be pervasive in any economy where the central bank is using an interest rate rule.  The 
presence of inflation persistence, by itself, has nothing to say about whether prices are 
sticky or flexible, or whether the real effects of monetary policy are large or small. 
Based on Gavin and Kydland (1999), our real business cycle model has a 
shopping time specification for money.  There are no sticky prices and there is no limited 
participation in financial markets.  Agents’ decisions in a period are taken only after all 
shocks are observed.  In this model, inflation persistence is sensitive to the degree of 
interest rate smoothing and the central bank's reaction to output.  The only exogenous 
  1source of persistence is the technology shock. Note, however, that inflation persistence 
can occur even if there no persistence in the shocks because the real rate responds 
persistently to uncorrelated technology shocks.      
In the next section we summarize evidence about inflation persistence, focusing 
on the period since 1980.  We then briefly describe the structure of our model.  In the 
following sections, we use the model to show that inflation persistence can be caused by 
central banks using an interest rate rule, even in the absence of price rigidities.  
 
Inflation Persistence 
Our approach is to analyze both U.S. data and the artificial data generated by our 
model via the methodology of Fuhrer and Moore (1995).  In Figure 1, we reproduce the 
output and inflation components of a vector autocorrelation function similar to the one 
used by Fuhrer and Moore to illustrate some basic characteristics of U.S. data.  These 
autocorrelation functions are derived from a three-variable autoregression including four 
lags each of output (the deviation of real GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott trend), inflation 
(the change in the logarithm of the GDP deflator), and the interest rate (the rate on 3-
month U.S. Treasury securities).  Our time period is different (1980:Q2 to 2001:Q4), but 
the shapes are similar to theirs.   The persistence of inflation and the cross-correlations 
are dampened relative to those calculated using pre-1980 data.
1  We also present one-
standard-deviation bands around the estimated vector autocorrelation functions; the bands 
are constructed using the bootstrap technique described by Runkle (1987). The standard 
deviations are calculated from a distribution created with 10,003 draws from the 
  2randomized residuals.  Three draws were discarded because they resulted in a VAR with 
unstable roots.  
Starting in the upper left-hand corner of Figure 1 and moving right, we see that 
inflation is persistent and at least one standard deviation above zero out to the ninth 
lagged quarter.  The cross-correlations between inflation and the lagged output gap are 
positive and at least one standard deviation above zero for six lags.    In the bottom left-
hand panel, the cross-correlation between output and the lagged inflation rate is positive 
in the contemporaneous period, but becomes negative at 2 years, and then returns to zero 
by the third year.  Finally, the autocorrelation function for output shows that it is also 
persistent.  The autocorrelation is high at one lag but decays quickly, reaching zero by the 
fifth quarter. 
  
The Economic Environment  
  We investigate the effects of alternative monetary policy rules embedded in a 
neoclassical growth model with shocks to production technology, shopping time 
technology, and the monetary policy rule.  We include a stochastic shopping time 
technology so that we will have three independent sources of error in the data sets 
generated by our model.  These data sets will be used to generate vector autocorrelation 
functions from a three-variable VAR.  
The economic structure.  Many identical households inhabit the model economy.  
Each household maximizes 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Gavin and Kydland (1999, 2000) show that the covariance structure of nominal and real time series are 
not stable across the October 1979 policy change.  Levin and Piger (2003) show that ignoring such 
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where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor, ct is consumption expenditure, and lt is leisure time.  
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where 0 < µ < 1 and  γ  > 0 but different from 1.  This CES function, with unitary 
substitution elasticity between consumption and leisure, was chosen because it is 
consistent with postwar U.S. data in which long-run hours worked per person changed 
little despite the large increase in real hourly compensation.  
   The household’s stock of capital, k, is governed by the law of motion, 
kk x t t t + = − + 1 1 () , δ                                                          (3) 
where 0 < δ  < 1,  δ  is the depreciation rate, and xt is investment.   
The typical agent spends available time, T, in three basic activities: input in 
market production, leisure, and transaction-related activities such as trips to the bank, 
shopping, and so on.  Larger money balances make the shopping activity less time 
consuming.  By holding more money, households have more time for work and/or 
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  4mt is the nominal stock of money at the beginning of period t, and Pt is the price of 
physical goods relative to that of money. The parameter ω1,t of the shopping time 
technology is equal to its steady state level plus an innovation, ε t
d
, that is independent and 
identically distributed with a zero mean and variance, σ d
2. By restricting ω1, t and ω2 to 
have the same sign and ω2 < 1, the amount of time saved increases as a function of real 
money holdings in relation to consumption expenditures, but at a decreasing rate.  Note 
that in the timing of the model, only money that is brought in from the previous period is 
available to reduce shopping time.
2 














                                                  (6) 
 
where T is the total time available and nt is time spent in market production. 
  The nominal budget constraint for the typical individual is 
11 (1 ) , tt tt t t t tt t tt t t t t Pc Px m b Pwn Prk R b m v ++ +++= + + + + +                             (7) 
where wt is the real wage rate, rt is the rental rate of capital, and vt is a nominal lump-sum 
transfer from the government.   t R  is the nominal interest rate earned on bonds, which are 
in zero net supply in equilibrium.  The government transfers money balances directly to 
households according to its policy rule.  It produces money and conducts policy at zero 
cost. 
 Aggregate  output,  Yt, is produced using labor and capital inputs: 
  YCX z N K t t t t t t =+=
− θ θ 1 ,                                                      (8) 
                                                 
2 Note that this timing convention is used in Kydland (1989).   
  5where Xt is the total of investment expenditures and zt is the level of technology, which  
is subject to transitory shocks.  The technology changes over time according to  
zz tt t + =+ 1 ρλ , + 1                                                               (9) 
where 0 < ρ < 1 and the innovation, λt+1, is distributed with a positive mean and with 
variance σ λ
2.  
A law of motion analogous to that for individual capital describes the aggregate 
quantity of capital.  The distinction between individual and aggregate variables is 
represented here by lowercase and uppercase letters, respectively.  This distinction plays 
a role when computing the equilibrium of a model with government policy in which the 
equilibrium is not simply the solution to a stand-in planner's problem.  Competitive factor 
markets imply that in equilibrium each factor receives its marginal product.  
Monetary Policy.   Since the early 1960s, the Federal Reserve has used an 
indicator of reserve market pressures to guide open market operations.  For most of the 
time since the 1970s, that indicator has been the interest rate on bank reserves, the federal 
funds rate.  By setting a short-term target for the federal funds rate, the Fed automatically 
supplies reserves to meet unexpected shocks to money demand.  We assume that the 
central bank uses this control over the monetary transfer to implement an interest rate rule 
of the type suggested by Taylor (1993): 
( ) ( )
*
1 ln ln , ty t t Rr Y Y π 1 π νν π −− =++ − + − π                                     (10) 
where 
*
t R  is the period t nominal interest rate target chosen by the central bank at the 
beginning of period t; π t t t PP =− − ln ln 1 is the inflation rate; and the bar over a symbol 
refers to the steady-state value.  Taylor's original specification did not include the lagged 
  6interest rate.   We also allow for the possibility that the central bank smoothes interest 
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where we have also included a policy shock,
s
t ε , that is independent and identically 
distributed with a zero mean and variance, σ
ε
s
2 .  This shock is a control error that occurs 
at the beginning of period t.     
Competitive Equilibrium.   A competitive equilibrium is achieved when the 
households and firms solve their optimization problems and all markets clear.  Due to 
constraints, the agent’s choice of any four variables – say leisure, consumption, 
investment, and nominal borrowing/lending – will determine the others via individual 
budget and time constraints.  Therefore, there are only four unique first-order conditions 
that can be derived from the agent’s optimizing behavior.  Roughly, the first can be 
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This expression is complicated by the fact that the agent’s time spent at leisure is 

















,  then, in the absence of shopping time, κ t =1 for all t 
and this condition is the standard condition equating the ratio of marginal utilities of 
leisure and consumption to the real wage rate.   
  7In this model there are three ways of substituting consumption across time.  One 
is through investment in capital, one is through holding money, and one is by holding 
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Again, note that in the absence of shopping time, this first-order condition becomes the 
familiar expression equating the ratio of expected marginal utilities to the gross real 
interest rate.   
Next we have the first-order condition associated with the choice of money 
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Written in this way, we can see that if there are no shopping time costs, then the ratio of 
expected marginal utilities is equal to the expected real return on that asset.  In the case of 
money, the return is the inverse of the gross inflation rate, or PP tt +1 . 
Finally, the first-order condition associated with buying or selling government 
bonds is given by  
1
11
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Once again we note that in the absence of shopping time costs this first-order condition 
reduces to the familiar one where the ratio of marginal utilities has been set equal to the 
real return to holding bonds. 
To analyze the quantitative implications of our model, we use the computational 
method described by King and Watson (1998).  The transition equation for the nominal 
  8interest rate is given by the bank’s interest rate rule.  In equilibrium, aggregate output and 
the money stock must be consistent with individual choices.  The price level is 
determined in equilibrium by forcing bonds to be in zero net supply.  Linearizing first- 
order conditions, transition equations, and equilibrium conditions around steady-state 
values results in the approximation that represents our model in the experiments below.  
 
MONETARY POLICY EXPERIMENTS 
Table 1 summarizes the baseline calibration used in the experiments.  Information 
about deviations from this baseline case is given in the text and figures when appropriate.  
The calibration is based on empirical estimates of steady-state relations among the 
model’s variables.  Most of the estimates come from long-run or average values.  
Measurements from panel data also are used.    
The parameter θ in the production function is the model’s steady-state labor share 
of output and is set equal to 0.65.  This is in line with estimates obtained for the United 
States if approximately half of proprietors’ income is considered to be labor income.  We 
use a quarterly depreciation rate of 0.025.  Persistence in the technology shock is 
assumed to be 0.95 and the standard deviation of the technology shock is set equal to 
0.0075—values in line with those estimated by Prescott (1986).   
  Turning to the household sector, the annual real interest rate is 4 percent, yielding 
a quarterly discount factor, β, of approximately 0.99.  The risk-aversion parameter, γ, is 
set equal to 2, which means more curvature on the utility function than that 
corresponding to logarithmic utility. This value is in the range of results reported by 
Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Neely, Roy, and Whiteman (2001). 
  9We calibrate the money-time tradeoff by setting ω2, the curvature parameter, equal 
to -1.  This implies a long-run money demand function with interest elasticity equal to 
-0.5, consistent with the empirical evidence in Hoffman and Rasche (1991), Lucas 
(1994), and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997).  With the steady-state output and money 
stock normalized to unity, the steady-state price level is determined by setting the annual 
income velocity of money at 6.7—equal to the average of M1 velocity between 1980 and 
2001.
3   We assume zero real economic growth and zero money supply growth in the 
steady state, so the steady-state inflation rate is also zero.
4  Given the price level, we 
deriveω1 from the household’s first-order condition for the choice of money holding.  
The implied steady-state value of ω1 is -0.0022.  The magnitudes of ω1 and ω2 can be 
understood through a marginal evaluation around the average.  If the real money stock is 
increased by 1 percent relative to its steady state, then a household's resulting weekly 
time saving is less than a minute. The standard deviation of the payments technology 
shock is set so that, when it is scaled by the level of payments technology, it is equal to 
0.0025.     
  Without loss of generality, we normalize steady-state shopping time to zero and 
choose time units so that n + l  = 1.   In line with the panel-data estimates of Ghez and 
Becker (1975), we set n = 0.3.  The remaining parameter µ, the share of consumption in 
the utility function, usually is determined from the conditionMU MUc A /  = w and usually 
turns out to be close to n in magnitude.  In this case, because of the dependence of time 
(and therefore l) on m/Pc, the corresponding condition can be written as  
                                                 
3 M1 is adjusted for the introduction of sweep accounts after 1994.  See Anderson and Rasche (2001) for a 
discussion of these accounts and the need for adjusting M1. 
4 Adding trends would not change the qualitative nature of our results, but would complicate the 
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The implied value for µ is 0.33.  Because the scale of  1 ω ─and the second term in 
equation (16)─is small relative to 1/w, the addition of the shopping time feature has only 
a tiny effect on the calibration of µ.  
  The parameters of the Taylor rule are not precisely estimated in the literature.  We 
used Taylor’s value for the weight on inflation (1.5).  The covariance structure of output 
and inflation are not very sensitive to alternative values of this parameter.  However, the 
covariance structure is sensitive to the weight on output.   Kozicki (1999) uses a wide 
variety of measures of inflation and output for the United States during the period from 
1983 to 1987 to estimate alternative weights in Taylor-type rules.  She reports a range of 
values for the output weight between -0.025 and 0.1.
5  Using a model similar to ours 
Dressler (2003) estimates the weight on output to be negative, but small and not 
statistically significant.  Using both sticky- and flexible-price models, Ireland (2002) 
estimates values for the weight on output that are negative, close to the bottom of the 
range found by Kozicki.  We found that a zero weight results in the positive correlation 
between output and inflation that we observe in the data.   
If we do not apply some interest rate smoothing then inflation is much more 
persistent than estimated in post-1980 data.  Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Sack 
and Weiland (2000) estimate the interest rate smoothing parameter to be in the range of 
0.7 to 0.8.  Rudebusch (2002) argues that it should be much lower.  We chose a degree of  
interest rate smoothing (0.5) that, in conjunction with a zero weight on output and our 
  11assumed shock variances, led to a first order autocorrelation of inflation that was about 
0.5.  The standard deviation of the monetary policy shock is assumed to be 0.125, or 50 
basis points per quarter at annual rates.   
Baseline case.  In Figure 2 we report the vector autocovariance function of output 
and inflation using the baseline policy rule.  As discussed above, the policy rule was 
calibrated so that the first order autocorrelation for inflation is about 0.5.  Both the cross 
correlation of inflation with lagged output and the cross correlation of output with lagged 
inflation are positive at short horizons.  The autocorrelation in output also looks much 
like U.S. data because the technology shock process was calibrated to match time series 
properties of real GDP.  Contrary to the U.S. data, patterns of the cross-correlations 
between inflation and output appear to be backwards; that is, the model cross-correlations 
of inflation with lagged output becomes negative after about a year, whereas in data they 
remain positive for about two years.  The model cross-correlations of output with lagged 
inflation remain positive for about two years, whereas in the data they become negative at 
about one year.   This occurs because the trough in the price level leads the peak in the 
output cycle in the data, but lags in our model. But, as Cooley and Hansen (1995) 
showed, that is also true in sticky price models. 
Stabilizing inflation.  Inflation persistence is not sensitive toνπ, the weight on 
inflation, as long as the weight is large enough to avoid indeterminacy.  Using an 
analytically tractable model with some features similar to ours and zero weight on output 
in the policy rule, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) show that there are real indeterminacies 
                                                                                                                                                 
5  These values are taken from Table 3, page 18, of Kozicki and adjusted for our quarterly scaling of 
inflation and the interest rate. The estimates are a bit higher in specifications that include interest-rate 
smoothing. 
  12for values of νπ  less than unity.
6  Numerical analysis confirms that this is the case for our 
model when there is no weight on output. When theνy = 0.125, indeterminacy exists when 
νπ  falls below 1.061. The region of indeterminacy lies below a curve that is 
approximately linear from (νπ,νy) = (1,0) to (νπ,νy) = (1.061, 0.125).   
In our experiments with the baseline model but with alternative weights on 
inflation, we found that both the first-order autocorrelation (φ1) for inflation and the 
cross-correlation between inflation and output were relatively insensitive to values of νπ   
between 1.2 and 3.  In all our experiments, a draw was discarded if it resulted in an 
estimated VAR with unstable roots. This occurs more often as we get closer to the region 
of indeterminacy.   
Output stabilization.  The inflation autocorrelations are more sensitive to the 
weight on output than they are to the weight on inflation. Figure 3 reports the results of 
experiments in which we set the weight on inflation at 1.5 and vary the weight on output 
between plus and minus 0.125.  With νy = -0.125, φ1 is 0.80.  It declines to a minimum 
value of 0.54 as νy is raised toward zero.  Then it rises quickly to a plateau at 0.90 as νy is 
raised further.  Given the other baseline parameters, variance of the inflation rate is 
minimized for values of νy near .025. The VARs appear to be most stable when there is 
no weight on output.   
The positive correlation between inflation and output in U.S. data has been 
broadly interpreted as evidence that monetary policy has large real effects.  Figure 4 
shows how the cross-correlation is influenced by the weight on output in the policy rule.  
                                                 
6 Their case that is closest to ours is the cash-in-advance specification for money demand with a backward-
looking rule.  There are still important differences in the utility function and the timing of the household’s 
  13The correlation is positive, about one half, if there is no weight on output or if the weight 
is negative.  For positive values of νy the correlation eventually becomes negative. 
Interest-rate smoothing.   In preparing for this study, we thought that interest-rate 
smoothing would be important. Dotsey (1999) uses a model with sticky prices to show 
that the output effects of a monetary policy shock are greatly amplified with interest-rate 
smoothing. He also found that inflation persistence may disappear if the central bank 
smoothes interest rates. In this flexible price model, the main effect of adding interest-
rate smoothing is to reduce inflation persistence.     
Figure 5 reports the results of experiments in which we vary the weight on the 
lagged interest rate, ρR, between 0 and 1. With the baseline calibration for other 
parameters, raising ρR from 0 to 1 reduces the first-order autorcorrelation from above 0.9 
to 0.  Even if there is no persistence in technology shock, the first-order autocorrelation 
will be above 0.9 if there is no interest rate smoothing.  Inflation persistence drops more 
quickly the more interest rates are smoothed if there is no persistence in the technology 
shock.  Interest-rate smoothing tends to make VARs from the experimental data unstable 




In this section we report impulse responses to a one-percent shock to the level of 
technology.  We do not show the response of output because it is insensitive to changes 
                                                                                                                                                 
access to the bond market that affect the pricing of the nominal interest rate and the conditions for real 
determinacy. 
7 There is a region of indeterminacy in our model for the baseline model with interest-rate smoothing for 
values of ρR  between 1 and 5.18.  
  14in the policy rule.
8  This approximate neutrality results because a realistic calibration of 
the shopping time function does not make money holdings large enough to matter for 
output fluctuations.  The response of output follows a pattern familiar in RBC models. A 
positive technology shock raises output by more than the size of the shock because hours 
worked also increases. High persistence in the technology shock causes output to remain 
well above the steady state for many years.  The path for output is largely independent of 
the policy regime.  The response of the price level, however, is not.  This is important for 
understanding the effects of putting weight on output in the policy rule.  Therefore, we 
focus on two policy rules in this section.  One is our baseline case.  The other is the 
baseline case except that we set the coefficient on output to 0.125, the value implied for 
our quarterly model by Taylor’s original specification that used annual rates for the 
interest rate and inflation. 
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses of the price level to a positive technology 
shock.  In the baseline case, the price level rises, but only slightly.  In the case with a 
large weight on output, the price level declines smoothly.  The inflation dynamics can be 
seen more clearly in Figure 7 which shows the interest and inflation rate responses to 
technology shocks under these two cases.  Except for the one-period delay in the policy 
reaction, the interest rate and inflation responses are very similar.  It is interesting to note 
that putting more weight on output does not mean that interest rates rise in response to a 
technology shock.  In this model the opposite occurs because of the dynamic interactions 
between output and inflation.      
                                                 
8 However, monetary policy can be important for the real economy if the central bank chooses a policy rule 
that leads to real indeterminacy. 
  15  At first glance, it may appear unusual that putting more weight on output causes 
the response of the nominal interest rate to a technology shock to become negative.  The 
dynamic response can be understood by thinking about what happens with a fixed money 
stock.  In a model like ours but with a fixed money stock, a 1 percent shock to technology 
leads to about a 0.3 percent decline in the price level.  The one-time decline in the price 
level is unexpected and, by itself, does not affect nominal interest rates.  The price level 
then very gradually rises back to the steady state (inflation is slightly above the steady 
state rate).  Since output and the price level move in opposite directions, putting a large 
weight on output has the effect of muting the effect of interest rate policy on stabilizing 
inflation.  Under the Taylor rule, on impact, the price level response to a technology 
shock looks more like it would under a fixed money rule. When there is no weight on 
output, the public knows that interest rate policy is aimed at stabilizing inflation.  In 
effect, the interest rate rule is a promise to provide money growth in a manner that 
prevents the need for price jumping.  Consequently, the price level does not have to fall 
in the period of the shock. 
Figure 8 shows how the money stock responds to a positive technology shock.  
When the central bank is following the Taylor rule with a large coefficient on output, a 
technology shock is associated with a simultaneous reduction in the inflation rate.  In the 
next period, the central bank responds by lowering the interest rate about 20 to 25 basis 
points.  This is associated with a large jump in the money stock.  This is consistent with 
the central bank’s need to deliver a long period of inflation slightly below the steady state 
rate.  The real interest rate will remain above its steady state, while the nominal rate 
remains below the steady state.  When there is no weight on output, the result is opposite, 
but muted.  The money supply falls slightly in the period when the central bank raises the 
  16interest rate.  In this case the nominal rate stays slightly above the real interest rate for an 
extended period so that the equilibrium requires a long period of inflation slightly above 
the steady state.  In this model, setting the weight on output equal to 0.025 essentially 
eliminates any effect of a technology shock on inflation or the market interest rate.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Inflation persistence has been considered evidence against flexible price general 
equilibrium models because it is nearly impossible to generate inflation persistence in 
these models if the central bank is following an exogenous money supply rule.  Most of 
the quantitative work on the cyclical effects of monetary policy in these models was done 
using such money supply rules. We show that it is quite easy to generate inflation 
persistence in flexible price models if the central bank is following an interest rate rule.  
The key to understanding inflation dynamics under interest rate targeting rules is to 
understand how the central bank is managing the short-term nominal interest rate relative 
to the real interest rate.  Any policy that induces a persistent difference between the 
nominal and real interest rates will also induce inflation persistence.  There is also a 
substantially lower variance of inflation in models with interest rate rules than in models 
with a fixed money stock or exogenous money supply rules.  In the case of the fixed 
money stock, the fluctuations in the price level are driven mainly by fluctuations in real 
output.  In the case of interest rate rules, they are driven by fluctuations in the spread 
between nominal and real interest rates.  
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Table 1: Parameter Calibration for the Baseline Case  
 
Parameter Symbol  Value 
Depreciation rate  δ  0.025 
Discount factor  β  0.99 
Relative risk aversion  γ  2 
Consumption share in utility  µ  0.33 
ω1  -0.0022  Shopping time parameters  
ω2 -1 
Labor share in production  θ  0.65 
Steady state share of time 
supplying labor services 
n  0.3 
Fed's reaction to inflation  νπ 1.5 
Fed's reaction to output gap  νy 0 
Persistence in the Policy 
Rule 
ρz 0.5 
Persistence in the 
Technology shock 
ρz 0.95 
Standard deviation of 
Shocks 
   
Production Technology  σz 0.0075 
Payments technology   σd* |ω1|  0.0025 





  20Figure 1: U.S. Data 1980:Q2 to 2001:Q4 Vector Autocorrelation Function
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One-standard-deviation error bands are calculated using a bootstrap method with 10,000 draws.
Three draws were rejected because the roots of the VAR were unstable.
21Figure 2: Vector Autocorrelation Function Using Model Data with 
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These are the average vector autocorrelation functions computed from 100 histories.  
The dashed lines reflect plus and minus one standard deviation.  One draw was 
rejected because the roots of the VAR were unstable.
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In all these experiments, νπ = 1.5 and ρR= 0.5.

















Inflation is shown with a dashed line and the interest rate is shown 
with a solid line. In all these experiments, νπ = 1.5 and ρR= 0.5.
















In all these experiments, νπ = 1.5 and ρR = 0.5.
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